A Game Theoretic Approach to Minimize the Completion Time of Network
  Coded Cooperative Data Exchange by Douik, Ahmed et al.
A Game Theoretic Approach to Minimize the
Completion Time of Network Coded Cooperative
Data Exchange
Ahmed Douik†, Sameh Sorour∗, Hamidou Tembine†, Mohamed-Slim Alouini†, and Tareq Y. Al-Naffouri†∗
†King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
∗King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Email: †{ahmed.douik,hamidou.tembine,slim.alouini,tareq.alnaffouri}@kaust.edu.sa
∗{samehsorour,naffouri}@kfupm.edu.sa
Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic frame-
work for studying the problem of minimizing the completion time
of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative
data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In
this configuration, clients cooperate with each other to recover
the erased packets without a central controller. Game theory
is employed herein as a tool for improving the distributed
solution by overcoming the need for a central controller or
additional signaling in the system. We model the session by
self-interested players in a non-cooperative potential game. The
utility function is designed such that increasing individual payoff
results in a collective behavior achieving both a desirable system
performance in a shared network environment and the Pareto
optimal solution. Through extensive simulations, our approach
is compared to the best performance that could be found in
the conventional point-to-multipoint (PMP) recovery process.
Numerical results show that our formulation largely outperforms
the conventional PMP scheme in most practical situations and
achieves a lower delay.
Index Terms—Cooperative data exchange, instantly decodable
network coding, non-cooperative games, potential game, Nash
equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Network Coding
Since its introduction in [1], NC was shown to be a
promising technique to significantly improve the throughput
and delays of packet recovery especially in wireless erasure
networks, due to the broadcast nature of their transmissions.
These merits are essential for real time applications requiring
reliable transmissions and fast recovery over erasure channels,
such as multimedia streaming [2].
Two important classes of NC for such applications can be
distinguished in the literature: the Random Network Coding
(RNC) [3], [4] and the Opportunistic Network Coding (ONC)
[5], [6]. RNC is implemented by combining packets with
independent, random and non zero coefficients [3]. Despite
its attractive benefits such as optimality in number of trans-
missions for broadcast applications and ability to recover even
without feedback [4], RNC is not suitable for the applications
of our interest since it does not allow progressive decoding
of the frame, is not optimal for multipoint to multipoint com-
munications (multicast) and require expensive computation at
the clients to decode the frame. In ONC, packet combinations
are selected according to the received/lost packet state of each
client [6]. ONC was show to be a graceful solution for packet
recovery for wireless network [7].
One ONC subclass that suits most of the aforementioned
application is the instantly decodable network coding (IDNC)
since it provides instant and progressive decoding of packets.
IDNC can be implemented using binary XOR to encode and
decode packets. Furthermore, no buffer is needed at the clients
to store non instantly decodable packets for future decoding
possibilities. Thanks to its merits, IDNC was an intensive
subject of research [2], [8]–[20]. In [21], the authors studied
the problem of minimizing the completion time in IDNC. The
completion time was proofed to be related to the decoding
delay in [22] and can be better controlled with it.
B. Motivation and Related Work
In all aforementioned works, the base station of a point-to-
multipoint network (such as cellular, Wi-Fi and WiMAX and
roadside to vehicle networks) was assumed to be responsible
for the recovery of erased packets. This can pose a threat
on the resources of such base stations and their abilities
to deliver the required huge data rates especially in future
wireless standards. This problem becomes more severe in
roadside to vehicle networks since the vehicles usually bypass
the roadside senders very fast and thus cannot rely on it for
packet recovery but rather on completing the missing packets
among themselves. One alternative to this problem is the
notion of cooperative data exchange (CDE) introduced in [23].
In this configuration, clients can cooperate to exchange data by
sending IDNC recovery packets to each other over short range
and more reliable communication channels, thus allowing
the base station to serve other clients. This CDE model
is also important for fast and reliable data communications
over ad-hoc networks, such vehicular and sensor networks.
Consequently, it is very important to study the minimization
of delays and number of transmissions in such IDNC-based
CDE systems.
Unlike conventional point-to-multipoint scenario, the IDNC
based CDE systems require not only decisions on packet
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combinations but also on which client to send in every
transmission in order to achieve a certain quality for one of the
network metrics. Recently Aboutorab and al. [20] considered
the problem of minimizing the sum decoding delay for CDE
in a centralized fashion. By centralized, we mean that a central
unit (such as the base station in the cellular example) takes the
decisions on which client to send which packet combination
in each transmission.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework
for studying the problem of minimizing the completion time
of instantly decodable network coding for cooperative data
exchange in decentralized wireless network. The problem is
modeled as cooperative control problem using game theory as
a tool for improving the distributed solution by overcoming
the need for a central controller or additional signaling in the
system.
Cooperative control problems entail numerous autonomous
players seeking to collectively achieve a global objective. The
network coding problem is one example of a cooperative
control problems, in which the global objective is for all play-
ers to efficiently use a common resource by opportunistically
taking advantage of the possible coding occasions. The central
challenge in cooperative control problems is to derive a local
control mechanism for the individual players such that the
players operate in a manner that collectively serves the desired
global objective.
In this paper, we derive expressions for the individual utility
functions in such way that increasing individual payoff results
in a collective behavior achieving a desirable system perfor-
mance in a shared network environment. We then improve the
game formulation to include punishment policy and reduce
the set of equilibrium to the one dimensional line containing
the Pareto optimal solution of our interest. To the best of our
knowledge, using game theory tools to model IDNC-based
CDE has not been addressed in the literature and only heuristic
algorithm were proposed to solve the problem in a centralized
fashion [20]. Moreover, this work can serve as a background
to build more complicated system in which the feedback or
the players state are not available.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows: Background
about game theory and specially potential games is briefly
recalled in Section II. In Section III, we present our network
model and protocol. The game parameters, and formulation are
presented in Section IV. The punishment policy and the new
game formulation are provided in Section V. In Section VI,
we present the game equilibrium and the algorithm used
to simulate the system. Before concluding in Section VIII,
simulations results are illustrated in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND: NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
A. Definitions and Notations
We define a finite stochastic non-cooperative game, like in
[24], with a common state by the 6-uplet:
G = (M, {Ai}i,Ω, {Ai}i, {αi}i, q, {Ui}i), (1)
where:
• M = {1, ...,M} is the set of players,
• {Ai}i is the set of all possible actions during the course
of the game,
• Ω is the set of possible states of the game,
• Ai(ω) is the set of possible action for player i in the state
w ∈ Ω of the game,
• αi : Ω −→ 2Ai is the correspondence determining the
possible actions at a given state of a game,
• qt is the conditional distribution of the transition proba-
bility from state to state. For independent states games,
q is the distribution over the set Ω and can be ignored in
the definition of the game. Otherwise the game is called
competitive Markov decision process [25],
• Ui is the utility function of player i, which will be defined
further in the paper.
Let ω(t) ∈ Ω be the state of the game at the stage t. For
notation simplicity, the set of actions of player i at stage t
will be denoted by Ai(t) instead of Ai(ω(t)). Let A(t) =
A1(t)× ...×AM (t) be the set of all possible actions that can
be taken by all the players at the stage t of the game.
For an action profile at = (a1(t), ..., aM (t))
T ∈ A(t), let
at,−i denote the profile of players other than player i. In
other words, at,−i = (a1(t), ..., ai−1(t), ai+1(t), ...aM (t))
T.
The subscript T denote the transpose operator. We can write
a profile at of actions as (at,i, at,−i). Similarly, the notation
A−i(t) =
∏
j 6=i
Aj(t) refers to the set of possible actions of
all the player other than player i at stage t of the game. Let
ht = (ω(1), a(1), ..., a(t − 1),ω(t))T be the history of the
game at stage t that lies in the set:
Ht =
(
t−1⊗
t′=1
Ω×A(t′)
)
× Ω. (2)
The utility function Ui for player i is defined as:
Ui : A(t)×Ht −→ R
(at, ht) 7−→ Ui(at, ht), (3)
where in the notation X −→ Y , X refers to the set of
arguments and Y the set of images by the function and
x 7−→ f(x) gives the mapping of each argument.
We may write Ui(at, ht) as Ui(at,i, at,−i, ht). For clarity
purposes, the notation X refers to a matrix whose ith column
is Xi. The notation x refers to a vector whose ith entry is xi.
We denote by {0, 1}x×y the set of matrices of dimension x×y
containing only 0s and 1s. We also use the notation {0, 1}x to
refer to the set {0, 1}x×1. The notation [X1, ..., Xn] refers to
the matrix whose ith column is the vector Xi and the notation
X = [xij ] refers to a matrix X whose ith row and j column is
the element xij . The game G is said to be finite if the number
of times it is played is finite. For such games, let T be the
final stage of the game.
B. Potential Games
Potential games have been introduced in [26]. The definition
of a potential game G is given by:
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Definition 1. The game G is an exact potential game if there
exists a function φ such that:
∀ i ∈M,∀ t, ∀ at, a′t ∈ A(t), (4)
Ui(at, ht)− Ui(a′t,i, at,−i, ht) =
φ(at, ht)− φ(a′t,i, at,−i, ht).
In other words, a game G is an exact potential game if there is
a function φ that measures exactly the difference in the utility
due to unilaterally deviation of each player [24].
Such a function φ is called the exact potential of the game.
Note that such potential does not directly guarantee the Pareto
optimality of the Nash Equilibrium (see Cournot oligopolies
[26]). Both Pareto optimality and Nash Equilibrium will be
defined in the next section. Instead of being a warranty of
Pareto efficiency, the potential function can be seen as a
quantification of the disagreement among the players [26]. In
the dynamic system [27], the potential represents a Lyapunov
function of the game.
Note that other type of potential games can be found in the
literature: the weighted, ordinal, generalized and best-response
potential games [28]. The theorems stated in the next section
will not depend on the nature of the potential game considered
and hold for all of them [24] as far as the game is potential.
C. Equilibrium Existence and Pareto Optimality
The definition of the Pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the
following:
Definition 2. An action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) is called a Pure
Nash equilibrium if:
∀ i ∈M, Ui(a∗t , ht) = max
at,i∈Ai(t)
Ui(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht). (5)
In other words, a NE is an action profile a∗t in which no player
can increase his utility by unilateral deviation. In engineering
system, the NE is a stable point to operate [29].
An attractive property of the NE is called the Pareto-
Optimum Nash Equilibrium (PONE) which is defined as:
Definition 3. An action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) is called a Pareto-
Optimum Nash Equilibrium if for all NE action profile b∗t , we
have:
∀ i ∈M, Ui(a∗t , ht) ≥ Ui(b∗t , ht). (6)
In other words, the PONE is the NE that achieves the highest
utility for all the players among all the other NE.
General results about equilibrium existence and uniqueness
are provided in [30]. Since our problem is a cooperative
control game, then we can make use of the results of the po-
tential games [31]. Before stating the main results concerning
equilibrium of potential games, we first define the coordination
game [27]:
Definition 4. Let G = (M, {Ai}i,Ω, {Ai}i, {αi}i, q, {Ui}i)
be a potential game with a potential function φ. The game
G′ = (M, {Ai}i,Ω, {Ai}i, {αi}i, q, φ) is called the coordi-
nation game of G.
The following theorem gives the relationship in terms of
equilibrium between the potential game and its associated
coordination game:
Theorem 1. Let G be a potential game with potential φ and
G′ its associated coordination game. Then the set of NEs of
G coincides with the set of NEs of G′. Moreover, the actions
profile a∗t ∈ A(t) maxima of φ are NE of G.
Proof: The proof of this theorem can be found in [27].
Note that the converse of this theorem is not generally true
i.e. not all the NEs of G are maxima of φ [27]. The existence
of a NE in potential game is ensured by this corollary:
Corollary 1. Every finite potential game admits at least one
NE.
Proof: The proof comes directly from Theorem 1. For a
finite game, the potential function is finite and therefore have
at least one maximum and thus the game admits at least one
NE.
The following theorem characterize the PONE in a coordi-
nation game:
Theorem 2. Let G be a potential game with potential φ such
that its corresponding coordination game is itself i.e. G = G′
then the maximum of φ is the PONE of G.
Proof: According to Theorem 1, the maximum a∗t of φ
is a NE of G and since φ is the utility function of G therefore
a∗t is a NE that yields the highest utility. More specifically a
∗
t
yields the highest utility among all the NE of G and thus it is
the PONE.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND PROTOCOL
A. Network Model
The network we consider in this paper consists of a set
M = {1, ...,M} geographically close clients (players) that
require the reception of source packets that the base station
(BS) holds. Each player is interested in receiving the frame
N = {1, ..., N} of source packets regardless of the order.
In the first n time slots, the BS broadcasts the N source
packets of the frame N uncoded. Each player i is experiencing
a packet erasure probability qi assumed to be constant during
this phase. Each player listens to the transmitted packets
and sends an acknowledgement (ACK) upon each successful
reception of each packet. We assume that at the end of this
initial phase, each packet of the frame is at least acknowledged
by one of the players. Otherwise, this packet is re-transmitted
by the BS.
After this initialization phase, for each player i, the packets
of the frame N can be in one of the following sets:
• The Has set (denoted by Hi): The sets of packets suc-
cessfully received by player i.
• The Wants set (denoted by Wi): The sets of packets that
were erased at player i. Clearly, we have Wi = N \Hi.
In this configuration, we assume a perfect reception of
the acknowledgement by all the players and that each player
3
knows the packets sets of all the other players. Each player
stores the information obtained after the transmission at time
(t−1) in a state matrix (SM) S(t) = [sij(t)], ∀ i ∈M, ∀ j ∈
N such that:
sij(t) =
{
0 if j ∈ Hi(t)
1 if j ∈ Wi(t).
(7)
B. Network Protocol
After the initial transmission, the recovery phase starts.
In this phase, the players cooperate to recover their missing
packets by transmitting to each other binary XOR encoded
packets of the source packets they already hold in order to
minimize the completion time.
The packet combination is chosen according to the available
packets they have, the information available in the SM and the
expected erasure patterns of the links. Let P = [pij ], i, j ∈M
denote the packet erasure probability (i.e. the probability to
loss a packet) from player j to player i. All the packet
erasure probabilities are assumed to be constant during the
transmission of the frame. Since the packet erasure probability
depends not only on the link but also on the available power
used to transmit, therefore pij can be different from pji.
We assume that each player knows all the packet erasure
probabilities linking him to other players (i.e. player i knows
pji, ∀ j ∈ N ) and that each transmission can be heard by all
the players. Therefore only one player will transmit a packet
combination at each time slot. Otherwise, due to interference
between transmissions, none of the players will be able to
decode a packet.
In this phase, the transmitted coded packets can be one of
the following three options for each player i:
• Instantly Decodable: A packet is instantly decodable for
player i if the encoded packet contain at most one packet
the player does not have so far. In other words, it contains
only one packet from Wi.
• Non-Instantly Decodable: A packet is non instantly de-
codable for player i if it contains more than one packet
missing for that player. In other words, it contains at least
two packets from Wi.
• Non-innovative: A packet is non-innovative for player i
if it do not allow him to reduce its Wants set. In other
words, it does not contains packets from Wi.
We define the conventional decoding delay [8], [9] as follows:
Definition 5. At any cooperative phase transmission, a player
i, with non-empty Wants set, experiences a one unit increase
of decoding delay if it successfully receivers a packet that is
either non-innovative or non-instantly decodable.
The cooperation decoding delay can be defined as:
Definition 6. At any cooperative phase transmission, a player
i, with non-empty Wants set, experiences a one unit increase of
decoding delay if not exactly one player transmitted or only
one player transmitted and its conventional decoding delay
increases.
In other words, if more than one or none players transmits,
all the players will experience a decoding delay and if player
i is the only transmitting player, he will experience a delay
along with all players that successfully received a packet that
is either non-innovative or non-instantly decodable. In the rest
of the paper, we will use the term decoding delay to refer to
the cooperative decoding delay. We define the targeted players
by a transmission as the players that can instantly decode a
packet from that transmission. After each transmission in the
recovery phase, its targeted players send acknowledgements
consisting of one bit indicating the successful reception. This
process is repeated until all players report that they obtained
all the packets. Let T be final stage of the game. The definition
of T can be written as:
T = min {t ∈ N∗ such that S(t) = 0}. (8)
Since we assume single hop transmissions, which means
that all the players are in the transmission range of each other,
each of them can already overhear all the feedback sent by
the other players and thus the system does not require any
additional feedback load.
IV. COMPLETION TIME GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the game parameter to
be able to model the problem of minimizing the completion
time in IDNC as a non-cooperative potential game. We then
provide the expression of the utility for the game.
A. Game Parameters
Let κi(t) be the optimal packet combination that player i
can generate at the stage t of the game. We have κi(t) ∈
{0, 1}N with κij(t) = 1 means that packet j is included in
the packet combination and 0 otherwise. The mathematical
expression of this combination can be found in [22]. Since
the SM is known by all players, therefore each player can
compute the optimal packet combination (or a sub-optimal
since the computation of the optimal was shown to be NP-
hard) of all the other players.
In this game formulation, we assume complete and perfect
information. The former assumption means that the actions
available to the players and the utility functions are common
knowledge i.e. every player knows the data of the game, every
player knows that the other players know the data of the game,
every player knows that every player knows that every players
knows the data of the game, and so on, ad infinitum. The
latter assumption means all the players know the history of
the game perfectly. Note that these assumptions do not add
extra constraints to the problem but are rather intrinsic to it.
At each stage of the game, each player has two possible
actions: either he transmits or he listens. Therefore, we define
the action space of player i at each stage t of the game as
Ai(t) = {transmit κi(t), remain silent}. Note that the action
space of the players are not symmetric since each player can
transmit a different packet combination at each stage. Let at be
the actions taken by all the users at the stage t. For simplicity
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of notation, we will define at as the following:
at : A(t) −→ {0, 1}M
(a1(t), ..., aM (t)) 7−→ at = (b1(t), ..., bM (t))T,
(9)
where,
bi(t) =
{
0 if ai(t) = {remain silent}
1 otherwise.
(10)
The set of targeted players by a packet combination are
those that can instantly decode an innovative packet from
the combination. Let τκ(t) be the set of targeted player by
the packet combination κ at the stage t of the game. The
mathematical definition of this set is given by:
τ : {0, 1}N −→ {0, 1}M
κ(t) 7−→ τκ(t) = (τ1(κ(t)), ..., τM (κ(t)),
(11)
where:
τi(κ(t)) =
{
1 if
∑N
j=1 sij(t)κj(t) = 1
0 otherwise.
(12)
The players that experience a conventional decoding delay
after a transmission are those with non-empty Wants set and
are not targeted by the transmission. Define τκ(t) = 1− τκ(t)
as the set of non targeted players and let Mw(t) be the set of
players with non-empty Wants set defined as follows:
Mwi (t) =
{
0 if
∑N
j=1 sij(t) = 0
1 otherwise.
(13)
The state ω of the game is the erasure patterns of the links
between each couple of players. These states can be described
by the following formula:
ω : N∗ −→ Ω = {0, 1}M×M
t 7−→ ω(t) = [Xij ], 1 ≤ i, j ≤M , (14)
where Xij is a Bernoulli random variable defined as follows:
Xij =
{
0 with probability pij
1 with probability 1− pij .
(15)
The Xij are independent of each other and therefore the
ω(t) are independent identically distributed (iid). The game
can be seen as a random matrix game. We now can compute
the decoding delay Dw,κ experienced by all the users when
user i sends the packet combination κ at the stage t using the
following expression:
Dwi,κ(t) : {0, 1}M+N −→ {0, 1}M
(ωi(t), κ(t)) 7−→ ωi(t) ◦ τκ(t) ◦Mw(t),
(16)
where ◦ is the Hadamard product. We also define the cu-
mulative decoding delay experienced by all players since the
beginning of the recovery phase (beginning of the game) until
the stage t of the game:
D : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ {0, 1}M
(at, ht) 7−→ D(at, ht), (17)
where:
D(at, ht) =
D(at−1, ht−1) +M
w(t) if ||at||1 6= 1
D(at−1, ht−1) +Dwi,κi(t) otherwise
with i such that ai(t) = ||at||1.
(18)
In the case of the Point to Multipoint (PMP) recovery
process (when only the base station is transmitting), the
completion time Ci can be approximated [22] by the following
expression:
C˜i =
Wi +Di − qi
1− qi . (19)
Since in the CDE, all users may be transmitting to each other,
then the completion time can be approximated by:
Ci =
Wi +Di − pi
1− pi
, (20)
where pi is the average erasure probability linking the player
i to the other players. This average erasure probability can
be expressed in terms of the erasure matrix as follows: pi =||P i||1
M
. Let C be the vector of the completion times, W the
vector of the Wants sets and p the one of the average erasures.
Therefore, we define the expected completion time of each
player as follows:
C : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ {0, 1}M
(at, ht) 7−→ (W +D(at, ht)− p)./(1− p),
(21)
where the operator x./y refers to the division of each element
of vector x by the element of vector y.
B. Utility Functions
In this first formulation, we take the cost (-utility) function
to be the natural delay in the network.
Game 1 (Completion time Game):
• Players: Users in set M
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection transmission
policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht.
• Utilities: UCTi for each player i, where at each stage t ≥ 1
and for any given history ht and action profile at:
UCTi : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ R
(at, ht) 7−→ −||C(at, ht)||∞. (22)
This game formulation is a non-cooperative stochastic po-
tential game. However, this definition of the game suffers
from many flaws. First, by inspection of the NE of the game
(Appendix A), we clearly can see that most of the NE yield
the worst payoff. This occurs when more than one player
is transmitting. Without a punishment policy, the game can
loop infinitely without reducing the Wants set of any player.
Secondly, this multitude of NE will not make the system work
in its best point which is the PONE. For these reasons, the
overall performance of the game will be very poor and a more
robust definition of the game must be addressed.
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V. PUNISHMENT AND PARETO OPTIMALITY
A. Punishment and Back-off Function
In the first definition of the game, after a collision occurs,
each of the players that transmitted can re-transmit in the next
stage of the game. In order to overcome the scenario in which
multiple consecutive collisions occur, we impose a punishment
period of V to every player responsible of a collision. In other
words, players responsible of a collision will back-off and will
not be able to transmit during the next V transmissions. Let
ct = (c1(t), ..., cM (t))
T ∈ {0, 1}M be the collision indicator
defined as follows:
ci(t) =
{
1 if ai(t) = 1 and ||at||1 > 1
0 otherwise.
(23)
Let C be the collision history over the last V stage of the
game. The mathematical definition of this variable is:
C : Ht −→ {0, 1}M×V
ht 7−→ C(ht) = [ct−V , ..., ct−1]. (24)
For notation consistency, the collision indicator for a non
positive time index is taken 0 i.e. c−t = 0, ∀ t ≥ 0. The
back-off function indicates at each stage t of the game which
players are allowed to transmit. The mathematical definition
of this function is:
B : {0, 1}M×V −→ {0, 1}M
C(ht) 7−→ B(ht) = C(ht)1. (25)
Let A′i(t) be the action space of player i at each stage t of
the game defined as follows:
A′i(t) =
{
Ai(t) if Bi(ht) = 0
{remain silent} otherwise. (26)
B. New Game Formulation
In order to encourage sparsity of the action profile vector
at, the `1 regularizer is added to the previous definition of
the utility function. Moreover, prioritization between players
is added when all action profiles will yield a higher expected
completion time than in the previous stage of the game. This
additional term is scaled by the number of player to not change
the original game. The new game formulation is:
Game 2 (New completion time Game):
• Players: Users in set M
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection of a transmis-
sion policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history
ht.
• Utilities: UCTi for each player i, where at each stage t ≥ 1
and for any given history ht and action profile at:
UCTi (at, ht) = −||C(at, ht)||∞ − ||at||1
− ||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
. (27)
As for Game 1, Game 2 is a non-cooperative stochastic
potential games. In the next section of the game, we will proof
that this formulation effectively addresses the concerns of the
first version.
VI. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS AND DISTRIBUTED
LEARNING ALGORITHM
In virtue of Corollary 1, there exist at least one NE.
Moreover, according to Theorem 2, the maximum of the utility
function is the PONE of the game. However, the existence of
the NE or the PONE is not sufficiency. We first define the
price of anarchy, introduced in [32] to be able to characterize
the equilibrium in a game.
Definition 7. The price-of-anarchy (PoA), at stage t, is the
worst-case efficiency of a Nash Equilibrium among all possible
strategies. In other words, the PoA is defined as:
PoA(t) =
maxs∈S(t)W (s)
mins∈E(t)W (s)
, (28)
where:
• S(t) is the set of all possible strategies at stage t,
• E(t) is the set of all NE at stage t,
• W : S −→ R is a fairness function .
The PoA is a concept that measures how the efficiency of a
game degrades due to selfish behavior of its players. Since we
have in our game the Pareto Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
and the utility function is the same for all the players (the
corresponding coordination game is the game itself), then the
previous definition reduces to the following:
PoA(t) =
maxs∈E(t)φ(s)
mins∈E(t)φ(s)
. (29)
The utility function is always negative in our context.
Therefore, the PoA is a well defined quantity. In this paper,
since the utility function is strictly negative, we will compute
the PoA using the cost function φ′ = −φ. The PoA can be
expressed in terms of the cost function as follows:
PoA(t) =
mins∈E(t)φ′(s)
maxs∈E(t)φ′(s)
. (30)
A. Game Equilibrium Analysis of Game 1
The following theorem gives the PoA of the Game 1:
Theorem 3. The PoA of Game 1 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =
1 if Z(t) = ∅
1−
Y0(t)− min
j∈Z(t)
(Yj(t))
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + Y0(t)
otherwise ,
(31)
where φ′ = −UCTi , ∀ i ∈M is the cost of the game and the
set Z is the set defined by
Z(t) = {j ∈M such that Yj(t) < Y0(t)}, (32)
and Y0(t) = max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
is the increase in the cost function
when not exactly one player is transmitting and Yj(t) =
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
the cost when only player j is trans-
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mitting with Q(t) defined as:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (33)
Ci(at−1, ht−1) + 1/(1− pi) > ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞
and Mwi = 1}.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix A.
B. Equilibrium Investigation of Game 2
The following theorem gives the PoA of the Game 2:
Theorem 4. The PoA of Game 6 can be expressed as follows:
PoA′(t) = (34)
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
if Z(t) 6= ∅
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
otherwise .
where φ′ = −UCTi , ∀ i ∈M is the cost of the game and the
set Z is the set defined by
Z(t) = {j ∈M such that Yj(t) < Y0(t)}, (35)
and Y0(t) = max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
is the increase in the cost function
when not exactly one player is transmitting and Yj(t) =
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
the cost when only player j is trans-
mitting with Q(t) defined as:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (36)
Ci(at−1, ht−1) + 1/(1− pi) > ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞
and Mwi = 1}.
Moreover, the PoA can be bounded by the following expres-
sions:
1 ≥ PoA′(t) ≥

1−
1 + Y0(t)− min
j∈Z(t)
(Yj(t))
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2 + Y0(t)
if Z(t) 6= ∅
1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2 + Y0(t)
otherwise .
(37)
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix B.
For stage t of the game with Z(t) = ∅, the expected
completion time will increase anyway and thus the PoA do
not have a practical signification in this case. In stage t where
Z(t) 6= ∅, we have:
PoA′(t) > PoA(t). (38)
This new definition of the game offers a more efficient
equilibrium. Therefore, for any learning algorithm and a long
running period, Game 2 will performs better in terms of delay
than Game 1.
C. Distributed Learning Algorithm
In this paper, we will employ the best-response algorithm to
simulate the system. In the original formulation, by Cournot
[33], players choose their actions sequentially. At each time
slot, a player selects the action that is the best response to the
action chosen by the other players in the previous time slot.
Since the state of the game is not known to players, the utility
function will be replaced by the expected utility function. This
can be done by replacing the actual state ωi(t) by its expected
value P i(t) in (16). The following theorem characterize the
outcome of the best-response algorithm for our games:
Theorem 5. For the second version of the game, the best-
response algorithm will make the system operate in the PONE
of the game.
Proof: To proof this theorem, we fist introduce the
following theorem:
Theorem 6. Let G be a best-reply potential game with V a
best response potential. If the action a∗t maximizes V , then a∗t
is a NE.
Proof: The proof of this theorem can be found in [34].
From our previous analysis, the NE of the second game are
located on the one dimensional line in which only one player
is transmitting. Let a∗t be the PONE of the game such that
||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1. Assume that the outcome of the best-
response algorithm is the action profile a′t 6= a∗t . In virtue
of Theorem 6 and our previous analysis, the action profile
will have ||a′t||1 = aj(t) = 1, j 6= i. For simplicity, assume
that players take action sequentially in order. Assume first that
j < i i.e. player j will take action before player i. Therefore,
player j did not take its best-response game because he can
insure better payoff by choosing not to transmit. Hence, we
obtain j ≥ i. Assume now j > i. Since player i is taken
its best action then it will transmit. According to theorem 6
player j is unable to transmit otherwise the outcome will not
be a NE of the game. Therefore we obtain i = j. In other
words, the only outcome of the best-response algorithm is the
PONE of the game.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we first present the simulation results com-
paring the delay encountered by players when applying the
PMP system [22] against the distributed non decentralized
cooperative data exchange. We, then, compare the delay ex-
perienced by clients against the player-player packet erasure
probability relatively to the base station-player packet erasure
probability since the short range communications are more
reliable than the base station-player communications [20],
[23].
7
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
15
20
25
30
35
40
Number of Players M
Av
er
ag
e 
Co
m
pl
et
io
n 
Ti
m
e
N = 30 , P = 0.1 , Q = 0.2
 
 
PMP
CDE
Fig. 1. Mean completion time versus number of players M .
0.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
Average Players Packet Erasure Probability P/Q
Av
er
ag
e 
Co
m
pl
et
io
n 
Ti
m
e
M = 60 , N = 30 , Q = 0.3
 
 
PMP
CDE
Fig. 2. Mean completion time versus players erasure P .
In these simulations, the delay is computed over a large
number of iterations and the average value is presented. We
assume that the packet erasure probability remains constant
during a delivery period and change from iteration to iteration
while keeping its mean, P of the player-player and Q for the
base BS-players, constant. We also assume that each player
have perfect knowledge of the packet erasure probabilities
linking him to the other player (i.e. the estimation of this
probability is perfect).
Figure 1 depicts the comparison of the average completion
time achieved by the PMP scheme and our distributed CDE
scheme against the number of players M for N = 30, Q =
0.2, and P = 0.1. Figure 2 presents the mean completion time
against the ratio of the player-player and BS-player erasure
probability P/Q for M = 60, N = 30, and Q = 0.3.
From all the figures, we can clearly see that our cooperative
data exchange algorithms outperform the traditional PMP
approach. Figure 1, illustrates the gain in using a distributed
algorithm when the player-player channel conditions is better
than the BS-player channel (P = 0.5Q).
Figure 2 illustrates the mean completion time against the
player-player erasure probability for a fixed BS-player erasure.
In this configuration, for the same erasure probability, the PMP
scheme outperform the distributed approach. This can be ex-
plained first by the fact that the BS has all the packets whereas
any one player has only a subset and thus, in general, the BS
has better ability to form coding combinations that target more
players than any single player. It can also be explained by
the fact that in our CDE approach, the approximation of the
completion time using the decoding delay approach requires
the erasure probability between the sender in large sense and
the player. For the PMP scheme only the base station is
transmitting and therefore this probability is fixed (from BS to
players). However in the CDE scheme, all players can transmit
and we approximate the probability by the average erasure
linking each player to all the other players. This approximation
degrades the scheme. However as the channel linking players
become better, CDE starts to outperform even if players send
less efficient coding combinations and we clearly can see the
difference between our scheme and the PMP one.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we formulated the problem of minimizing the
completion time of instantly decodable network coding for
cooperative data exchange in decentralized wireless network as
cooperative control game. We employed game theory as a tool
to improve the distributed solution by overcoming the need
for a central controller or additional signaling in the system.
We modeled the session by self-interested players in a non-
cooperative potential game. The utility functions is designed in
such way that increasing individual payoff results in a collec-
tive behavior achieving both a desirable system performance
and the Pareto optimal solution. We compared our approach
to the one of the conventional point-to-multipoint recovery
process. Numerical results showed that our formulation largely
outperforms the conventional PMP scheme in most practical
scenarios and achieved a lower delay. The advantage of this
formulation is that it can be easily extended. For example,
this formulation can be extended to the case where not all
the players are in the range of each other. In other words, the
utility function will not be completely defined for the players.
Another interesting research direction is the multicast cast with
limited range. In this scenario, the packet demand of each
player can differ and players are not all in the transmission
range of each other. Finally, the case of imperfect feedback is
another important and more practical extension.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Note that the cost function can be written as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ξ(at, ht), (A.1)
with:
ξ(at, ht) = ||C(at, ht)||∞ − ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞. (A.2)
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Let Q(t) be the set of players that can potentially increase
the cost function at stage t of the game. The mathematical
definition of this set is the following:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (A.3)
Ci(at−1, ht−1) + 1/(1− pi) > ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞
and Mwi = 1}.
Clearly, if Q(t) = ∅, then any action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) is
a NE since all the profiles will not change the cost function
φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1). In that case, we have PoA(t) =
1. Now assume Q(t) 6= ∅. For action profiles at the cost
function will increase according to the norm of the action
profile by the quantity:
φ′(at, ht)− φ′(at−1, ht−1) =
max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
if ||at||1 6= 1
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
if ||at||1 = aj(t) = 1.
(A.4)
Let Z(t) be the set of players that can target players in the
critical set Q(t) and reduce the increase in the cost function.
This set is defined as:
Z(t) = {j ∈M such that
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
< max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
}. (A.5)
Two cases can be distinguished:
• Z(t) = ∅ : all action profile a∗t will yield the same
cast function φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
.
Therefore all action profile are NE of the game and the
PoA is equal to 1.
• Z(t) 6= 0 : action profile a∗t = aj(t) such that j ∈ Z(t)
will yield a lower cost function than the other profiles.
Define Y0(t) = max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
as the increase in the cost
function when not exactly one player is transmitting and
Yj(t) = max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
the increase when only player
j is transmitting. Clearly for action profiles a∗t such that
||a∗t ||1 = 0 are not NE since the unilateral deviation of player
i ∈ Z(t) will decrease the cost function. For action profile
a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 > 2, for any unilateral deviation, we have
||at,i, a∗t,−i|| > 1. Therefore, the cost function is unchanged
and all these action profiles are NE. Let a∗t be an action profile
such that ||a∗t ||1 = aj(t) = 1, then the difference in the cost
function for any unilateral deviation of player is:
φ′(at,i, a
,
t,−iht)− φ′(a∗t , ht)
= ξ(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− ξ(a∗t , ht) = Y0(t)− Yj(t). (A.6)
Thus, any unilateral deviation will yield the same or a higher
cost function. These profiles are NE of the game. Let the action
profile be a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) + aj(t) = 2. Two scenarios
can occur:
• i /∈ Z(t) and j /∈ Z(t): By the same argument than for
the case where ||a∗t ||1 > 2, any unilateral deviation will
yield the same cost φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + Y0(t).
Therefore it is a NE of the game.
• i ∈ Z(t) or j ∈ Z(t): By the same argument than for
the case a∗t = 0, the cost function can be decreased by
unilateral deviation of player i if j ∈ Z(t) and inversely.
This scenario is not a NE of the game.
We now characterize the set of all NE of the game:
E(t) =
{
A(t) if Z(t) = ∅
E1(t) otherwise ,
(A.7)
where
E1(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1 or ||at||1 > 2
or (||at||1 = ai(t) + aj(t) = 2 and i, j /∈ Z(t))}.
(A.8)
The PoA of Game 3 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =
1 if Z(t) = ∅
1−
Y0(t)− min
j∈Z(t)
(Yj(t))
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + Y0(t)
otherwise .
(A.9)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
As for game 3, the utility function of Game 4 can be written
as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ξ(at, ht), (B.1)
with:
ξ(at, ht) = ||at||1 +
||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
+ ||C(at, ht)||∞ − ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞. (B.2)
Let Q(t) be the set of players that can potentially increase
the expected completion time at stage t of the game. The
mathematical definition of this set is the following:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (B.3)
Ci(at−1, ht−1) + 1/(1− pi) > ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞
and Mwi = 1}.
Assume Q(t) = ∅, then any action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) will not
increase the maximum decoding delay and we have:
ξ(at, ht) = ||at||1 +
||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
(B.4)
=

||Mw(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = 0
1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1
||at||1 +
||Mw(t)||1
M
otherwise .
Clearly, we can see that all the profiles a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 > 1
or ||a∗t ||1 = 0 are not NE of the game anymore. Only action
profile with one entry not equal to 0 are NE. Now assume
Q(t) 6= ∅ and let Z(t) be the set of players that can target
players in the critical set Q(t) and reduce the increase in the
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cost function. This set is defined as:
Z(t) = {j ∈M such that
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
< max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
}. (B.5)
Two cases can be distinguished:
• Z(t) = ∅ : the expected completion time will increase
by the same amount max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
for all action profiles.
• Z(t) 6= 0 : some action profiles lead to lower increase of
the expected completion time than others.
Define Y0(t) = max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
as the increase in the cost
function when not exactly one player is transmitting and
Yj(t) = max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
the increase when only player
j is transmitting. If Z(t) = ∅ for an action profile a∗t , the
cost function can be expressed as:
ξ(a∗t , ht) = Y0(t)
+

||Mw(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = 0
1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1
||at||1 +
||Mw(t)||1
M
otherwise .
(B.6)
Clearly action profiles a∗t of type ||a∗t ||1 6= 1 are no more
NE of the game. Now assume Z(t) 6= ∅ the utility varies
with the chosen action profile. Let a∗t be an action profile
such that ||a∗t ||1 = α > 1. For some unilateral deviation of
player that are transmitting, the cost function will decrease. In
other words, we have:
φ′(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− φ′(a∗t , ht) = (B.7)
1 > 0 if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 > 1
Y0(t)− Yi(t) + 1 +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 = 1 and i ∈ Z(t)
1 +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 = 1 and i /∈ Z(t).
Thus, all action profile a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 > 1 are not NE and
it is clear to see that action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = 0
are also not NE of the game. Let a∗t be an action profile such
that ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1 and i /∈ Z(t). The difference in the
cost when player i deviates is:
φ′(a∗t , ht)− φ′(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht)
= 1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1 − ||Mw(t)||
M
> 0. (B.8)
Therefore such action profile is not a NE. Now consider the
action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1 and i ∈ Z(t).
The difference in the utility if any player deviates:
φ′(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− φ′(a∗t , ht) = (B.9)
1 + Y0(t)− Yi(t) +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,j , a∗t,−j ||1 = 2
Y0(t)− Yi(t) +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,j , a∗t,−j ||1 = 0.
The set of all NE of the Game 4 can be expressed as:
E(t) = (B.10)
{at ∈ A(t) s.t. ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1, i ∈ Z(t)}
if Z(t) 6= ∅
{at ∈ A(t) s.t. ||at||1 = 1}
otherwise.
The PoA of Game 4 can be expressed as follows:
PoA′(t) = (B.11)
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
if Z(t) 6= ∅
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
otherwise .
Moreover, the PoA can be bounded by the following expres-
sions:
1 ≥ PoA′(t) ≥

1−
1 + Y0(t)− min
j∈Z(t)
(Yj(t))
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2 + Y0(t)
if Z(t) 6= ∅
1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2 + Y0(t)
otherwise .
(B.12)
REFERENCES
[1] R. Ahlswede, N. Cai, S.-Y. Li, and R. Yeung, “Network information
flow,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 46, no. 4, pp.
1204–1216, 2000.
[2] X. Li, C.-C. Wang, and X. Lin, “On the capacity of immediately-
decodable coding schemes for wireless stored-video broadcast with
hard deadline constraints,” IEEE Transactions on Selected Areas in
Communications,, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 1094–1105, 2011.
[3] J.-S. Park, M. Gerla, D. Lun, Y. Yi, and M. Medard, “Codecast: A
network-coding-based ad hoc multicast protocol,” IEEE Tranaction on
Wireless Communications, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 76–81, 2006.
[4] T. Ho, R. Koetter, M. Medard, D. Karger, and M. Effros, “The benefits
of coding over routing in a randomized setting,” in Proc. of IEEE In-
ternational Symposium on Information Theory, (ISIT’ 2003), Yokohama,
Japan, 2003, pp. 442–448.
[5] S. Katti, H. Rahul, W. Hu, D. Katabi, M. Medard, and J. Crowcroft,
“Xors in the air: Practical wireless network coding,” Proc. of ACM Com-
puter Communication Review, (SIGCOMM’ 2006), Pisa, Italy ,October
2006, vol. 36, pp. 243–254.
10
[6] S. Katti, D. Katabi, W. Hu, H. Rahul, and M. Medard, “The importance
of being opportunistic: Practical network coding for wireless environ-
ments,” in Proc. of 43rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control and Computing, (Allerton’ 2005), Monticello, Illinois, USA, Sep.
2005.
[7] S. Rayanchu, S. Sen, J. Wu, S. Banerjee, and S. Sengupta, “Loss-aware
network coding for unicast wireless sessions: design, implementation,
and performance evaluation,” in Proc. of the International Conference on
Measurement and Modeling Of Computer Systems (ACM SIGMETRICS’
2008), Annapolis, MD, USA, ser. SIGMETRICS ’08. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2008, pp. 85–96.
[8] S. Sorour and S. Valaee, “Minimum broadcast decoding delay for
generalized instantly decodable network coding,” in Proc. of IEEE
Global Telecommunications Conference, (GLOBECOM’ 2010), Miami,
Florida, USA, Dec. 2010, pp. 1–5.
[9] S. Sorour, N. Aboutorab, P. Sadeghi, M. S. Karim, T. Al-Naffouri,
and M.-S. Alouini, “Delay reduction in persistent erasure channels
for generalized instantly decodable network coding,” Proc. of IEEE
Vehicular Technology Conference, (VTC’ 2013), Dresden, Germany, pp.
1–5, June. 2013.
[10] P. Sadeghi, R. Shams, and D. Traskov, “An optimal adaptive network
coding scheme for minimizing decoding delay in broadcast erasure chan-
nels,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking,
vol. 2010, no. 1, 2010.
[11] A. Douik, S. Sorour, M.-S. Alouini, and T. Y. Al-Naffouri, “Delay
reduction in lossy intermittent feedback for generalized instantly decod-
able network coding,” in Proc. of IEEE 9th International Conference
on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications,
(WiMob’ 2013), Lyon, France, Oct. 2013.
[12] L. Lu, M. Xiao, and L. Rasmussen, “Design and analysis of relay-aided
broadcast using binary network codes,” Journal of Communications
(JCM), Special Issue on Advances in Communications and Networking,
Nov. 2011.
[13] S. Sorour, A. Douik, S. Valaee, T. Y. Al-Naffouri, and M.-S. Alouini,
“Partially blind instantly decodable network codes for lossy feedback
environment,” Accepted in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communica-
tions, available ArXiv e-prints.
[14] A. Douik, S. Sorour, M.-S. Alouini, and T. Y. Al-Naffouri, “Delay
minimization for instant decodable network coding in persistent channels
with feedback intermittence,” ArXiv e-prints, Jul. 2013.
[15] L. Lu, M. Xiao, and L. Rasmussen, “Relay-aided broadcasting with
instantaneously decodable binary network codes,” in Proc. of IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Computer Communication Networks, (ICCCN),
Maui, Hawaii, August, 2011.
[16] M. Esmaeilzadeh and P. Sadeghi, “Optimizing completion delay in
network coded systems over tdd erasure channels with memory,” in Proc.
of IEEE International Symposium on Communications and Information
Technologies, (ISCIT’ 2012), Queensland, Australia, Oct. 2012, pp. 883–
888.
[17] A. Douik, S. Sorour, M.-S. Alouini, and T. Y. Al-Naffouri, Accepted in
IEEE Wireless Communications Letters.
[18] S. Sorour and S. Valaee, “Effect of feedback loss on instantly decodable
network coding,” in Proc. of IEEE 7th International Wireless Communi-
cations and Mobile Computing Conference, (IWCMC’ 2011), Istanbul,
Turkey, July 2011, pp. 21–28.
[19] ——, “On densifying coding opportunities in instantly decodable net-
work coding graphs,” in Proc. of IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory Proceedings, (ISIT’ 2012), Cambridge, MA, USA,
July 2012, pp. 2456–2460.
[20] N. Aboutorab, P. Sadeghi, and S. Tajbakhsh, “Instantly decodable net-
work coding for delay reduction in cooperative data exchange systems,”
in Proc. of IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
Proceedings, (ISIT’ 2013), Istanbul, Turkey, 2013, pp. 3095–3099.
[21] S. Sorour and S. Valaee, “On minimizing broadcast completion delay
for instantly decodable network coding,” in Proc. of IEEE International
Conference on Communications, (ICC’ 2010), Cape Town, South Africa,
May, 2010, pp. 1–5.
[22] A. Douik, S. Sorour, M.-S. Alouini, and T. Y. Al-Naffouri, “Comple-
tion Time Reduction in Instantly Decodable Network Coding Through
Decoding Delay Control,” ArXiv e-prints, Jan. 2014.
[23] S. Tajbakhsh and P. Sadeghi, “Coded cooperative data exchange for
multiple unicasts,” in Proc. of IEEE Information Theory Workshop,
(ITW’ 2012), Lausanne, Switzerland, 2012, pp. 587–591.
[24] S. Lasaulce and H. Tembine, Game Theory and Learning for Wireless
Networks: Fundamentals and Applications, 1st ed. Academic Press,
2011.
[25] J. Filar and K. Vrieze, Competitive Markov Decision Processes.
Springer, 1997.
[26] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, “Potential games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 124 – 143, 1996. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825696900445
[27] G. Scutari, S. Barbarossa, and D. Palomar, “Potential games: A frame-
work for vector power control problems with coupled constraints,” in
Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal
Processing, (ICASSP’ 2006), Toulouse, France., vol. 4, May 2006.
[28] M. Voorneveld, “Best-response potential games,” Economics Letters,
vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 289 – 295, 2000. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176599001962
[29] G. Arslan, J. R. Marden, and J. S. Shamma, “Autonomous vehicle-
target assignment: A game-theoretical formulation,” Journal of Dynamic
Systems, Measurement, and Control, vol. 129, no. 5, pp. pp. 584–596,
2007.
[30] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points
for concave n-person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. pp.
520–534, 1965. [Online]. Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911749
[31] J. Marden, G. Arslan, and J. Shamma, “Cooperative control and potential
games,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B:
Cybernetics, vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 1393–1407, Dec 2009.
[32] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou, “Worst-case equilibria,” in Proc. of
the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science.
Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 404–413.
[33] A. Cournot, Recherches sur les principes mathe´matiques de la the´orie
des richesses. L. Hachette, 1838.
[34] H. Tembine, Distributed strategic learning for wireless engineers. CRC
Press, 2012.
11
